Hastily Formed Networks by Denning, Peter J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive





Sept, On. "Hastily Formed Networks." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 49.4 (2006): 15.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/50672
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM April  2006/Vol. 49, No. 4 15
On Sept. 11, 2001, terroristsattacked the World TradeCenter, taking 2,749 lives.
The attack resulted in severe eco-
nomic impact, especially to air-
lines, and a stock market loss of
$1.2 trillion. On Dec. 26, 2004,
a tsunami from a 9.1 earthquake
overran the shores of many coun-
tries along the vast rim of the
Indian Ocean. Over 283,000 peo-
ple died. On Aug. 29, 2005, Kat-
rina, a category-5 hurricane,
knocked out electric and commu-
nication infrastructure over
90,000 square miles of Louisiana
and Mississippi and displaced 1.5
million people. Six months later,
New Orleans still housed fewer
than 100,000 of its original 1.2
million residents. On Oct. 8,
2005, a magnitude-7.6 earthquake
devastated the Kashmir region of
Pakistan, killing over 87,000 peo-
ple. Besides being unexpected
major disasters, these events had
one other common feature: they
all involved hastily formed net-
works that quickly mobilized,
organized, and coordinated mas-
sive humanitarian responses.
The severity of these disasters
drove home an important point:
the quality of the response
depended not on response plan-
ning or on new equipment, but
on the quality of the network
that came together to provide
relief. How quickly were voice
and data communications
restored? How well did the many
players from disparate organiza-
tions collaborate? How effectively
did the network deliver help to
the victims? These incidents
demonstrated sharp differences in
the quality of the hastily formed
network (HFN), which directly
affected the effectiveness of the
response. Noting that these net-
works almost always involve mili-
tary, civilian government, and
non-government organizations,
the U.S. Departments of Defense
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Hastily Formed Networks
The ability to form multi-organizational networks rapidly is crucial to 
humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and large urgent projects.  Designing and 
implementing the network’s conversation space is the central challenge.
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made it a priority to learn how to
effectively assemble HFNs. We
coined the term at the Naval
Postgraduate School in 2004.
The lessons learned from the
networks involving government
carry directly into private settings.
They will benefit any urgent net-
work of multiple organizations
with no common authority that
must cooperate and collaborate.
Hastily formed networks is an
area where advanced networking
technology and human organiza-
tion issues meet. They can work
well together, or they can clash.
Our purpose here is to give an
overview of this critical area and
the challenges it offers to com-
puting professionals.
ORIGINS
The idea of quickly forming a
team for a particular, urgent task,
and then disbanding it when
done, is not new. Table 1 lists
three categories of events for
which an HFN must respond.
Because it involves relatively small
teams and known networks, the
first category is the easiest and
least likely to stress the HFN.
The middle category is the
type that emergency agencies
such as police and fire depart-
ments prepare for. They have pro-
fessional, highly trained teams
ready to respond to particular
incidents. They have well-devel-
oped practices for advance plan-
ning, training in appropriate
skills, and positioning of equip-
ment. They already use terms like
“ad hoc network” and “crisis
response network” to describe
what they do.
The third category puts the
greatest stress on the HFN. These
events require response beyond
the control and capabilities of any
single agency. The network struc-
ture will depend on the event and
the responding organizations.
The main aspects of the third-
category challenge are:
• Genuine surprise. The precipi-
tating event is in no known cate-
gory. There has been no advance
planning, training, or positioning
of equipment.
• Chaos. Everyone is over-
whelmed. No one understands
the situation or knows what to do.
People are frantic and panicky.
• Totally insufficient resources.
Available resources and training
are overwhelmed by the magni-
tude of the event.
• Multi-agency response. Several
agencies must cooperate in the
response, including military, civil-
ian government, and private orga-
nizations. These groups have had
little or no prior reason to collab-
orate. The shock of moving from
a state of “coexistence” to a state
of “collaboration” can be over-
whelming.
• Distributed response. The
response is distributed over a geo-
graphical area into many local
jurisdictions. The authority to
allocate resources and reach deci-
sions is distributed among many
organizations. Decisions by com-
mand-and-control do not work.
• Lack of infrastructure. Critical
infrastructures such as communi-
cations, electricity, and water do
not work. Makeshift infrastruc-
tures must be deployed quickly.
HFN DEFINED
The first priority after the precip-
itating event is for the responders
to communicate. They want to
pool their knowledge and inter-
pretations of the situation, under-
stand what resources are available,
assess options, plan responses,
decide, commit, act, and coordi-
nate. Without communication,
none of these things happens: the
responders cannot respond. Thus
the heart of the network is the
communication system they use
and the ways they interact within
it. We call this the “conversation
space” of the HFN.
An HFN has five elements: it is
(1) a network of people established
rapidly (2) from different commu-
nities, (3) working together in a
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Table 1. Kinds of events requiring response from hastily formed networks.
Prof. of IT (Denning) table 1 (4/06)
Examples
Fast response team for time-critical business 
problem or opportunity
Local fire, small earthquake, civil unrest, 
military campaigns
9/11 attack, other terrorist attacks, large 
earthquake, major natural disasters 
(Note: KU events can become UU events when 











Know what to do
Use existing network structures
May choose not to respond
Know what to do
Don't know time or place
Responding network structure known
Don't know what to do
Don't know time or place
Responding network structure unknown
Table 1. Kinds of events requiring response
from hastily formed networks. 
shared conversation space (4) in
which they plan, commit to, and
execute actions, to (5) fulfill a
large, urgent mission.
An HFN is thus much more
than a set of organizations using
advanced networking technology.
To be effective in action, HFN
participants must be skilled at:
• Setting up mobile communica-
tion and sensor systems; 
• Conducting interagency opera-
tions, sometimes called “civil-mil-
itary boundary”;
• Collaborating on action plans
and coordinating their execution, 
• Improvising; and
• Leading a social network, where
communication and decision
making are decentralized, and
there is no hierarchical chain of
command or ex officio leader.
Most participants do not have
a need for these skills in their
individual organizations. When
they come together, therefore,
they find it difficult to accom-
plish these tasks. When combined
with the overwhelming nature of
the urgent event, these inherent
difficulties can lead to a break-
down in the conversation space.
CONVERSATION SPACE
The ongoing need to communi-
cate and coordinate is fundamen-
tal for the success of any HFN.
The term conversation space was
introduced for the medium in
which all this takes place—from
forming community responses to
delivering actions. The conversa-
tion space is (1) a medium of
communication among (2) a set of
players (3) who have agreed on a
set of interaction rules. These
three aspects are summarized in
Table 2.
One of our early conclusions
was that the effectiveness of the
HFN rests on the quality of the
conversation space established at
the outset. It is not a foregone
conclusion that an effective HFN
can be established even when the
players are trained professionals,
as the situations in New York
City after 9/11 and in New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina
illustrate. In New York, the
mayor understood intuitively that
success would depend on every-
one, including especially the resi-
dents of the city, feeling included
in the relief effort. He made sure
information was shared, even if
piecemeal. While there were some
initial coordination difficulties,
the network came together and
was effective in relief and recov-
ery. A different picture occurred
in New Orleans. The various
agencies had major difficulties in
coordinating and the Federal
Emergency Relief Agency
(FEMA) did not deliver what
people thought it had promised.
At all levels there was a lot of fin-
ger-pointing and wrangling over
who would do what and who
would pay for what. When the
president put a new man in
charge at FEMA, there was no
immediate improvement in effec-
tiveness or criticism of the agency.
Attempts to impose standard mil-
itary-style command-and-control
in Louisiana and Mississippi were
ineffective. This is not intended
as a criticism of New York,
Louisiana, or Mississippi officials,
but rather an illustration that
effective coordination may not
happen even when all the parties
want it to happen.
Certainly a major difference
between New York and New
Orleans was the sheer scale of the
event. New York lost infrastruc-
ture in a limited area of perhaps
100 square blocks. The primary
agencies in the network ulti-
mately reported to the mayor.
Police and fire radios provided
basic communications in the
“ground zero” area. In contrast,
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Table 2. Components of conversation space.
Prof. of IT (Denning) table 2 (4/06)
Examples
Telephone, power, roads, meeting places, 
supplies, distribution systems
Citizens, fire department, policy department, 
highways department, federal emergency 
management agency
Situational awareness, sharing information, 
planning, reaching decisions, coordination, unified 
command and control, authority, public relations.  
(Note: environment has no common authorities, 









Media and mechanisms by which people 
communicate, share information, and 
allocate resources
Players included and their roles, core 
competencies, and authorities
Rules of the “game” followed by the 
players to organize their cooperation 
and achieve their outcomes
Table 2. Components of 
conversation space.
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New Orleans lost an entire city
and was part of a large area
(90,000 square miles) with
severely damaged infrastructure.
All communication systems were
knocked out; and as they were
gradually being restored, the lim-
ited-bandwidth channels were
overwhelmed by sheer numbers
of citizens trying to use them.
Many more agencies had to
cooperate on the response. Cop-
ing with all this effectively was
completely outside most respon-
ders’ experience.
New York City quickly built
trust among the responders and
citizens. New Orleans experi-
enced considerable difficulty in
building trust.
But this is one of the lessons:
the more overwhelming the
event, the more likely turf-assert-
ing tendencies will occur and
interfere with the effectiveness of
the network.
The overarching lesson is: the
effectiveness of an HFN depends
as much on the participating peo-
ple and organizations as it does
on the communication system
through which they interact.
CONDITIONED TENDENCIES
It is well known that individuals
under severe stress often forget
their recent training and regress
to old, ingrained habits [1, 7].
Richard Strozzi Heckler calls
these old habits conditioned ten-
dencies [6]. The old habit is
likely to be inappropriate for the
current situation and to make
matters worse.
The National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology ([4], p.
174) concluded that “a prepon-
derance of evidence indicates that
emergency responder lives were
likely lost at the World Trade
Center resulting from the lack of
timely information-sharing…”
Police radio transcripts cited by
NIST indicate that NYPD heli-
copters monitoring the two
burning towers detected signs of
structural collapse in the North
Tower and issued an emergency
evacuation order to all police. Yet
no one in the police department
communicated the imminent-
collapse information to the fire
department. What accounts for
this bizarre behavior?
Joseph Pfeifer, a deputy assis-
tant chief in the New York City
Fire Department, gives in his




cally can render them incapable
of effective response in an emer-
gency [5]. Pfeifer was among
those responding to the 9/11 dis-
aster in the World Trade Center.
His explanation for non-commu-
nicative behavior was that organi-
zational biases—ingrained social
habits of the separate organiza-
tions—prevented emergency per-
sonnel from talking to one
another. One of these biases is
organizational social identity that
prefers to share information
within the group but not outside.
Under stress, the group members
do not think to collaborate or
share information outside the
group, or to take personal respon-
sibility for the welfare of mem-
bers of other groups.
The purpose of Pfeifer’s study
was not to assign blame for need-
less loss of life in the 9/11
attacks, but to recognize the orga-
nizational conditioned tendency
as a real phenomenon that can
disable an HFN. The question is
how to prepare organizations to
work together in an HFN and
avoid the conditioned tendency.
Pfeifer proposed that the agencies
use unified command networks,
in which leadership is shared
among different organizations;
for example, an executive com-
mittee. This practice will likely
create the foundation for HFNs
that do not suffer non-communi-
cation leadership paralysis.
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The effectiveness of an HFN depends as much on the
participating people and organizations as it does on the 
communication system through which they interact.
A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE HFNS
(1) The quality of the conversa-
tion space is critical to success.
The space includes the communi-
cation systems, the participants,
and their interactions within
these systems. Effectiveness in
conversation space rests on skills
that participants may not ordi-
narily learn in their separate orga-
nizations.
(2) The physical communica-
tion systems are part of conversa-
tion space. Plan and test mobile
technologies that can be set up
quickly when the regular infra-
structure is down. Arrange for
security forces to protect the tem-
porary infrastructure. Use and
test all communications equip-
ment regularly. Use standard 
software and protocols—interop-
erability and simplicity of inter-
connection will be important.
Web services are a good example. 
(3) The participating organiza-
tions are another part of conver-
sation space. Each brings its own
culture, standard practices, and
decision-making protocols—
which may be incompatible with
other organizations. Individuals
can become disoriented when
familiar organizational practices
are suspended. They fail to take
initiative, while waiting for orders
that will never come. They do
not know how to function when
there is no common authority,
their established command-and-
control practices do not work,
and collaboration, not control, is
the only way to get actions done.
(4) Information glut will be a
problem in the network. As com-
munications are initially restored,
the victims will overload the
severely limited bandwidth as they
try to communicate with their
families. The responders them-
selves will overwhelm their col-
leagues with situational reports
and other data. New technologies
will be needed to manage infor-
mation glut and keep the network
functioning.
(5) Understand and practice
the effective technologies for col-
laborative networks. These
include Web servers to distribute
information, wiki and discussion-
thread software, chat and instant-
messaging services, virtual
markets, and coordination services
such as Groove (but Groove is
restricted to Windows platforms).
(6) Prepare to overcome the
barriers to interorganizational col-
laboration. These include conflict-
ing missions, unclear roles, turf
protection, incompatible processes
and information systems, disparate
cultures, accountability, mistrust,
and lack of knowledge of others’
capabilities [3].
(7) Prepare for organizational
conditioned tendencies to appear
under overwhelming stress. Train
group members in the basic HFN
skills. Promote political support
for the organizations to cooper-
ate, mutual respect for the com-
petencies that each organization
brings, concern for each other’s
welfare, and personal responsibil-
ity for actions and outcomes.
Practice with “unified com-
mand”—an executive committee
representing the participating
organizations that respects the
core competencies that each orga-
nization brings.
(8) Train the skill of improvisa-




HFNs bring new words and con-
cepts such as conversation space,
coordination without hierarchy,
and conditioned tendency. Learn
these concepts; they are important.
Interoperability and simplicity
are key technical challenges for
HFNs. Services offered via Web
interfaces are highly interopera-
ble; anyone can use them from
any computer. Chat and text
messaging services are highly
interoperable. But many key ser-
vices are not. For example, many
responders have found the
Groove software to be useful for
coordination, but Groove runs
only on Windows computers;
responders with Sun worksta-
tions, Apple Macintoshes, or
Linux-based computers are out of
luck. Many wireless networks are
not fully interoperable, for exam-
ple, Linux and Apple machines
use different protocols from Win-
dows machines for encryption
and passwords.
To prevent information glut,
we need tools to model, label,
and filter information so that net-
work participants receive the
information most likely to be
valuable to them. In crises espe-
cially, the participants need to
make most effective use of the
limited resources of decision-
making time and communica-
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tions bandwidth by restricting
the flow of unimportant bits.
Hayes-Roth shows how a
100,000-fold drop in informa-
tion volume is easily achievable
without loss of effectiveness [2].
Learn about the organizational
issues, such as collaborative coop-
eration and managing condi-
tioned tendencies. You may be
part of an organization that
responds in an HFN, and you
will need to know this.
Understanding how to create
HFNs is one of the most challeng-
ing parts of modern networking. It
is about how a network, its people
and its equipment, may function
efficiently under extreme stress.
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